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LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, HUMILITY, AND THE SCIENTIFIC

METHOD
By David J. Herring*
This essay describes a new approach to legal scholarship in
responding to the question of "what next for law and behavioral
biology?"' In pursuing this approach, the legal scholar seeks to
participate in the process of scientific inquiry. He or she does not draw
on scientific theory and research in order to prescribe particular laws and
policies. Instead, the legal scholar engages scientific theory in order to
ask new questions and to work with scientific researchers in formulating
and testing hypotheses that are relevant to law and policy.
Behavioral biology is one area of scientific inquiry that can support
this type of scholarly endeavor, albeit one that is well-suited to
enhancing discussions of law and policy. Owen Jones is a leading legal
scholar in this area whose work provides a useful conceptual
framework. 2 He has explained the law of law's leverage, delineating the
contribution behavioral biology can make to a detailed discussion of the
possible benefits and costs related to particular legal rules and regimes.3
(It is important to note that he has done this without advocating for any
particular legal result or regulatory scheme.) Jones has also explained
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. For their invaluable
insights,
comments and points of disagreement, I would like to thank Randy Alison Aussenberg,
Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Richard Delgado, Michele Kristakis, John Lanou, Debra
Lieberman, Michael Madison, Margaret Mahoney, Peter Oh, Justin Park, Thomas Ross,
Jeffrey Shook, Jean Stefancic, Mark Strauss, George Taylor, Lu-in Wang, Valerie Weis, and
Michael Weisberg.
1. This question raised one of the central issues addressed at an academic roundtable
organized by Owen Jones, Professor of Law and Professor of Biological Sciences at
Vanderbilt University, and attended by a group of leading legal scholars in April, 2006.
2. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997) [hereinafter Jones, Evolutionary
Analysis in Law]; Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage:
BehavioralEconomics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001) [hereinafter
Jones, Law's Leverage]; Owen D. Jones, Proprioception,Non-Law, and Biolegal History, 53
FLA. L. REV. 831 (2001) [hereinafter Jones, Biolegal History]; Owen D. Jones & Timothy H.
Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005).
3. See Jones, Law's Leverage, supra note 2.

QLR

[Vol. 25:867

the concept of time shifted rationality - a concept that may provide a
useful theoretical component for behavioral economics.4 In addition, he
has explained how consideration of behavioral biology can help identify
likely areas for legal regulation across societies.5 In this last endeavor,
Jones has made significant progress in developing a general theory of
law, identifying which areas of human activity are likely to generate
laws and gain the attention of lawmakers. 6
More germane to this essay, Jones' work demonstrates the
usefulness of specific findings from behavioral biology research to
discussions of law and policy. For example, he has used research that
identifies the dramatically higher risk of maltreatment faced by children
in stepfamilies. 7 Drawing from the concepts of inclusive fitness and
parental investment, behavioral biologists Martin Daly and Margo
Wilson hypothesized that children living with biologically unrelated
adults would suffer a higher rate of maltreatment. 8 Their examination of
data on child deaths from several societies provided support for their
hypothesis. 9 Jones has used this research to question child protection
policies that largely disregard stepfamily relationships in assessing the
risk of child maltreatment and in determining the appropriate level of
family support services. 10 Child welfare policymakers may want to
avoid stigmatizing stepfamily relationships by disregarding these
relationships. However, Jones' work reveals a significant cost related to
this policy goal and approach - an increased risk of child maltreatment."
Similarly, Jones has used behavioral biology research that

4.
5.

Id.
See Jones, Biolegal History, supra note 2.

6.

Id.

7. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2. The stepfamily research
used by Jones focuses on incidents of infanticide rather than on maltreatment generally. But it
is important to note that the behavioral biology researchers in this area only used the
occurrence of child death to test their broader hypothesis concerning a higher risk of
maltreatment within stepfamilies because there is relatively good, detailed data on child
deaths in comparison to that available on child maltreatment in general. See MARTIN DALY &
MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988) (In other words, child death served as a proxy for or
indicator of child maltreatment generally.). Because child maltreatment, as opposed to child
death, is a pervasive problem, identifying and addressing a higher risk of child maltreatment
adds a significant component to discussions of child welfare law and policy as they relate to
stepfamilies. Jones' work explores this powerful finding in a way that should generate further
discussion and research. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2.
8. See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE, at 83-91 (1988).
9. Id.
10. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2.
11.
Id.; see Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 435-36.
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addresses rape.' 2 The research supports a hypothesis that males
sometimes employ rape as a sexual strategy, and thus, that a rapist may
not be motivated solely by animus and violent tendencies toward
women.' 3 More specifically, the researchers found that victims of rape
are most often of reproductive age, with rape being relatively less
prevalent for prepubescent girls and post-menopausal women.' 4 Also,
rape is more likely to involve penile-vaginal intercourse, as opposed to
other forms of sexual interaction, when the victim is within her
reproductive years. 15 In addition, rape victims in some studies appear to
experience more severe trauma if they are within their reproductive
years. 16 As Jones explains, these findings
may be relevant to discussions
7
of how to prevent and punish rape.'
Noting the work of Jones and others in this area, Professor John
Monahan asserts that behavioral biology has the heuristic power to raise
interesting questions related to the law.' 8 For example, behavioral
biologists have drawn on concepts and theories in their field to pose the
question of whether infants are disproportionately killed by
stepparents. 19 The research generated by this question is relevant to
discussions of child protection practices, policies and laws.
Professor Monahan also notes that behavioral biology has
substantial breadth in that it possesses a set of core concepts that one can
employ to answer the interesting questions that it raises. 20 Concepts
such as inclusive fitness, kin altruism, discriminatory parental solicitude,
and reciprocal altruism hold broad explanatory power. For example,
these concepts provide guidance for thoughtful research that addresses

12. See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation
and Prevention,87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999).
13.
Id. at 853-72.
14. Id. at 866.
15. Id. at 868.
16. See Jones, supra note 12, at 868-69.
17. Id. at 909-33. Beyond his own theoretical and applied scholarship in this area,
Jones has actively fostered other legal scholars' use of behavioral biology research. He is a
frequent participant in programs at the Gruter Institute and he founded the Society for
Evolutionary Analysis in Law ("SEAL"). He has organized conferences that provide for
important and rich interactions among legal scholars, biologists and researchers from other
disciplines. Jones has also been available to read numerous draft papers, providing invaluable
comments and guidance. I and others have benefitted immensely from his contributions to
our projects.
18. See John Monahan, Could "Law and Evolution" Be the Next "Law and
Economics"?, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 123, 124 (2000).

19.

Id.

20.

Id. at 124-25.
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stepparent/stepchild relationships.
Finally, Professor Monahan discusses behavioral biology's depth. 21
Namely, he asks whether behavioral biology can answer legal questions
in the kind of specific detail necessary to guide both legal scholarship
and the law in action.2 2 In addressing this question, he recognizes the
high degree of specificity of modern evolutionary explanations.23 He
then points to the work of Daly and Wilson as a powerful example of
how behavioral biology theory can generate specific predictions that
subsequent empirical research confirms.24
Professor Monahan
concludes that the explanations of particular aspects of human behavior
arising from behavioral biology provide legal scholars with powerful
and useful insights.
In reaching his conclusion, Professor Monahan speculates that
behavioral biology's impact on legal scholarship could be similar to that
of economics. 25 In his view, economics has served as the "lodestone"
for a substantial portion of recent legal scholarship.26 Because of its
heuristic power, breadth, and depth, Professor Monahan asserts that
behavioral biology could be another lodestone for legal scholarship. 27
While I agree with Professor Monahan's basic conclusion, I do not
embrace his speculation because I envision using behavioral biology
research in a way that departs from my perception of how legal scholars
use economic concepts. Namely, my proposed approach does not offer
new theoretical paradigms or attempt to guide and assess broad
approaches to law and policy. Instead, I seek to use behavioral biology
research simply to raise questions and formulate hypotheses that
enhance discussions of particular laws and policies. This is an approach
that is much smaller in scope than the law and economics project.
However, I believe that, if developed carefully and rigorously, this
approach could eventually have a significant impact on legal
scholarship. It has the potential to be both deep (yielding small, focused
pieces) and broad (powerful and transformative when viewed as a
21. Id. at 125.
22. See Monahan, supra note 18, at 125.
23. Id.
24. Id.; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Psychology and Marital Conflict:
The Role of Stepchildren, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 9, 16-18 (David Buss & Neil Malamuth eds., 1996); Martin Daly & Margo
Wilson, Crime and Conflict: Homicide in Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, in CRIME
AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 66-69 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997).
25. See Monahan, supra note 18, at 126.
26. Id. at 123.
27. Id. at 126-28.
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whole). In the end, this approach has the potential to transform the legal
scholar from a mere consumer of scientific findings into a participant in
the production of new knowledge.
The scientific method lies at the core of this approach to legal
scholarship. This method is a process of inquiry used by researchers in
the basic sciences and other fields. 28 Researchers initiate the process by
developing a theory that recognizes and builds on others' work in the
area of inquiry.29
In this way, the scientific method is highly
collaborative in nature, often generating long lines of inquiry that
involve numerous researchers over a considerable period.3 °
Closely related to the development of theory is the formulation of
specific hypotheses that researchers can test in order to support the
theory. If the theory is correct, certain conditions should exist and
certain consequences should follow. Researchers can formulate research
questions and methodologies to determine if, and to what degree,
the
3
predicted conditions and consequences actually exist and result. '
Once researchers complete a test of a particular hypothesis, they
can consider additional tests of the hypothesis. If the test results either
fail to fully verify the hypothesis or introduce new and unexpected
elements, researchers can revise the hypothesis. The revised hypothesis
will generate additional research questions and tests. If the research
findings call the hypothesis into question in a fundamental way,
researchers may conclude that the hypothesis is false. Such a conclusion
may also call into question the overarching theory that generated the
hypothesis. As a result, researchers might abandon the theory by
formulating a new theory and paradigm in the area of inquiry. 32
This process of knowledge development has several important
characteristics. First, it is collaborative. Groups of researchers often
work in teams to design and conduct experiments.33 More important, the
process of questioning the results of experiments and conducting further
experiments engages researchers in a collective endeavor. Although
28. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law and Other
Cognate Disciplines,and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 406-09
(2004) (criticizing the law and social science movement for lacking a theoretical framework).
29. Id. at 408.
30. Id.
31. Id. 406-09.
32. See Ulen, supra note 28, at 406-09; THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
33. This is apparent from an examination of scientific journals, with the majority of
articles listing several co-authors who have worked together as a research team. See, e.g.,
issues of the journal Evolution and Human Behavior.
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they may not be on the same research team, researchers pursuing a
specific line of inquiry respond to and build on the work of others.14 It is
an on-going collective process that constantly produces additional
hypotheses, experiments, and knowledge.35
Second, this process is incremental.3 6 It proceeds with small,
careful steps. Each step or inquiry is focused, narrow, and small in
scope. These small steps constitute the heavy lifting of the scientific
method - work that does not commonly result in the discovery of
comprehensive knowledge or the expression of grand theory. Taking
these steps involves detailed work in the trenches of discovery and
knowledge production. It is work that is humble in nature, placing the
scholar within a collective and cumulative effort to discover the finest
details of how the world works.37

Third, this process is only useful in discovering and understanding
what is. It does not contribute to the conception of what ought to be.38
Researchers using this method are engaged in discovering detailed
aspects of how the natural world operates. Discoveries about what is
may be useful to individuals, groups, and societies who have previously
formulated, through a separate and independent process of inquiry and
analysis, what ought to be. But determining what ought to be is not the
project of scientific scholars. 39 Their project is much more focused and
modest.
This third characteristic of the scientific method raises the question
of whether it can contribute anything to legal scholarship. Arguably, the
law is almost exclusively about what a society determines ought to be.
The law reflects, and at times constructs, social values. It does not
simply accept what is. Therefore, one can strongly question the value of
a process utilized only to discover what is. Such a process may be
largely irrelevant to the social project of constructing, analyzing, and
understanding law and legal regimes.4 °
However, I believe that this process of scientific inquiry provides
34.

See Ulen, supra note 28, at 408.

35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.

38. See Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2, at 1163; Jones, supra note
12, at 893-95.

39.

Id.

40. My colleague, Professor Thomas Ross, has pressed this point with me in discussions
of my work, pointing me to Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978) and GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977), among others.

28, at 419-20.

See also Ulen, supra note
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legal scholars with an opportunity to pursue projects that depart from
those intended to examine and explicate what ought to be. Furthermore,
I believe that these projects will not be irrelevant. Rather, they will
contribute to our understanding of law, and even to the construction of
law.
In describing this approach to legal scholarship that arises from the
scientific method, it is useful to understand what this approach is not. It
is not traditional doctrinal analysis. Arguably, doctrinal scholarship
It is
shares many of the characteristics of the scientific method.
collaborative. The explication of legal doctrine involves numerous
individuals who examine, analyze, and explain legislative and judicial
decisions. Although these individuals may not often work in research
teams, they do engage in dialogue and interchange. In addition, because
doctrinal scholarship depends on the decisions of courts and legislatures,
it is necessarily incremental. Finally, a significant portion of doctrinal
scholarship is largely descriptive, and thus often entails an explication of
what is rather than what ought to be.4 '
But doctrinal scholarship engages the legal scholar in a process of
creation. The doctrinal scholar does not simply discover an aspect of the
natural world. This scholar observes, organizes, and analyzes the law,
and through this process, even if it is purportedly only descriptive in
nature, participates in the human effort to construct the law and a
particular society.4 2 She is not engaged only in the incremental
discovery of what is. Rather, she is engaged in the incremental analysis
of what is, and often the construction of what ought to be. By observing,
explaining, analyzing and critiquing legal doctrine, the doctrinal scholar
the law.43
often attempts to channel, if not direct, the development of
The doctrinal scholar's participation in the process of constructing what
is being studied (the law) differs markedly from the scientific scholar's
process of discovery. Consequently, the legal scholar dedicated to the
scientific method engages in scholarly projects that differ in nature from
those of the doctrinal scholar.
One can use this same distinction in addressing legal theory
41.
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 83-91 (1995); NICHOLAS
FROM POSNER TO
MERCURO & STEPHEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW:

POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 10-12 (2d ed. forthcoming) (manuscript at 10-12, first
chapter available on SSRN); cf Ulen, supra note 28, at 411.
See id.; POSNER, supra note 41; Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life's
42.
Golden Tree: EmpiricalScholarship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 60-61.

43.

See Ulen, supra note 28, at 411; Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115

HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1314-16 (2002).
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scholarship. The legal theorist frequently, if not always, strives to
participate in the construction of legal regimes. Large theory pieces
often prescribe the perception and development of law and society. The
theorist typically engages not only in the discovery of what is. She also
explores what ought to be. an The theorist often engages in ambitious
scholarly projects that extend well beyond the characteristic limits of the
scientific method.
In a recent article, Professor Thomas Ulen discusses the potential
for the scientific method in legal scholarship.45 He describes how law
and economics scholarship provides a robust example of the use of the
scientific method and asserts that, while use of this method is not the
only valid approach to legal scholarship, this approach holds the most
promise for securing the larger academic community's recognition of
legal scholarship as a fully legitimate intellectual endeavor.4 6 Legal
scholars' use of the scientific method allows them to pursue projects that
resemble those of other disciplines within the academic community. To
a degree unmatched by doctrinal scholarship and different types of legal
theory scholarship such as legal realism and critical legal studies, the
scientific approach provides a foundation for the development of
universal, overarching theories and the testing of hypotheses generated
by those theories.47
Ulen encourages legal scholars to embrace the scientific method to
test universal theories, such as economics' rational choice theory, in the
context of legal systems. 48 Accordingly, he urges legal scholars to
construct and participate in a creative, collective, widely collaborative,
and cumulative process of inquiry and to engage fully in empirical
research.49

Professor Ulen's vision for the study of law as science is extremely
ambitious. It entails an almost complete abandonment of traditional
approaches to legal scholarship, seeking to engage many, if not all, legal
scholars in a new scholarly endeavor.
The approach to legal scholarship described in this essay fits within
Ulen's vision, but is less comprehensive. It is an approach that some

44.

See POSNER, supra note 41, at 96-102; Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 42, at

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Ulen, supra note 28.
Id. at 428-29.
See Ulen, supra note 28.
Id. at 424-25.
Id. at 429; see also Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 42.

61.
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legal scholars (although certainly not all or even a majority 50 ) may be
interested in pursuing, not with the idea that it will transform the
scholarly endeavor throughout the discipline or that it will grant them
full status in the larger academic community, but with the modest goal
of participation in the discovery of new knowledge that may be relevant
to law and policy.
There are two steps involved in this approach to legal scholarship.
First, the legal scholar must become familiar with an area of scientific
research that is relevant to the development of law and policy.
Behavioral biology is an especially rich area of scientific research in this
regard.
The research in this field provides useful information
concerning many aspects of human behavior - the primary subject of
law and policy. 5' Of course, the legal scholar must become familiar not
only with the general concepts and theories in the particular scientific
field, but also with detailed findings from various research projects in
the specific areas of interest to the legal scholar. Accordingly, the legal
scholar must develop the habit of reading relevant scientific journals.
For example, the journal Evolution and Human Behavior is a good
source of behavioral biology research that may be relevant to particular
areas of law and policy.
The second step requires the legal scholar to actively seek and form
working relationships across disciplines. She would seek out researchers
who conduct studies relevant to particular issues of law and policy and
engage them in discussions of their work. Through these discussions,
the legal scholar may have an opportunity to contribute to the scientific
research endeavor, possibly influencing the questions that scientific
researchers raise and address, increasing the likelihood that they will
formulate and test hypotheses that provide useful knowledge for those
working with the law.
Ultimately, the legal scholar would become a member of the
scientific research team. Realization of this goal calls for an individual
who is comfortable with a modest role in the production of scholarship.
50. The point of this essay is not that the scientific method provides the only legitimate
approach to legal scholarship. There are certainly other valid approaches to discovering
knowledge and to legal scholarship. This essay does not intend to preclude or discount these
other approaches, but only to articulate a possible new approach.
51.
See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 407. That is not to say that the information
provided by behavioral biology research is not contested or controversial. However, even
many critics acknowledge the potential for useful behavioral biology research. See DAVID J.
BULLER, ADAPTING MINDS: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PERSISTENT QUEST
FOR HUMAN NATURE (2005).
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Such a legal scholar would be one member of a research team that would
often include several researchers who have much more knowledge of the
particular field of inquiry and of the scientific method. The legal scholar
would not likely lead the research team. She would contribute to the
team's formulation of its research agenda, but not drive it. She would
hope to have the team test hypotheses that relate to law and policy. She
would then translate and communicate the knowledge produced by the
research team to the legal and public policy communities, describing its
possible relevance to particular legal and policy issues.
Some of my current work provides an example of the first step in
this approach to legal scholarship. By attending academic conferences
sponsored by the Gruter Institute, I became aware of the field of
behavioral biology and its potential to contribute to legal scholarship.5 2
Speakers at the conference came from many disciplines, including
biology, economics, cognitive psychology, anthropology, law, and
medicine. They provided an excellent introduction to the field and a
sense of the intellectual energy surrounding behavioral biology research.
The conferences piqued my interest and inspired me to read
numerous books and articles describing evolutionary theory.5 3 As I read
this material, I became increasingly aware of its relevance to my work in
child welfare law and policy. The concepts of inclusive fitness, kinship
altruism, parental investment, parent-offspring conflict, and paternity
uncertainty appeared especially germane.54
This literature directed me to research conducted to test numerous
hypotheses based on evolutionary concepts.55 The articles reporting and
discussing the results of scientific research differ dramatically from the
typical law review article. These articles appear much smaller in scope
and ambition. Rather than attempt to analyze an entire area or issue,
reach a resolution, and provide suggestions for action, these articles
often address only the findings drawn from a very narrow, focused
experiment.5 6 These findings usually constitute a small step in the
52.
53.

Gruter Institute, www.gruterinstitute.org (last visited May 18, 2007).
See, e.g., ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985); MARTIN DALY & MARGO

WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1983); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN:
SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1993); TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH &
WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN NATURE (2001).

54. See TRIVERS, supra note 53.
55. See, e.g., articles in Evolution and Human Behavior, Journalof Personaland Social
Psychology, and EvolutionarySocial Psychology.
56. The line of articles discussing the ratio of the lengths of the second to fourth manual
digits as a predictor of the degree of sexually dimorphic traits and behaviors provide examples
of these narrow, focused experiments. See, e.g., J. Coolican & Michael Peters, Sexual
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development of knowledge related to a specific hypothesis.
But this appearance of smallness belies a larger, more ambitious
endeavor. Read together, research articles addressing a particular
57
hypothesis often reveal a substantial accretion of detailed knowledge.
They give rise to the sense of a collective research project that contrasts
sharply with the individualistic nature of many projects published in law
reviews.
This contrast eventually led me to question the standard approach to
legal scholarship. But more immediately, the research articles led me to
particular hypotheses and experiments that are relevant to child welfare
law and policy. For example, the concepts of inclusive fitness and
kinship altruism generate a set of hypotheses that are particularly
relevant. One such hypothesis is that individuals favor other individuals
whom they perceive as being biologically related to them, with the
extent of favorable treatment varying in conjunction with the degree of
biological relatedness (e.g. in general, a parent will provide more
favorable treatment to his child than to his nephew; a brother will
provide more favorable treatment to his full sister than to his half
sister). 58 A series of research studies, some involving animals and some
involving humans, provide substantial support for this hypothesis.59
Dimorphism in the 2D/4D Ratio and Its Relation to Mental Rotation Performance, 24
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 179 (2003); J.T. Manning, P.E. Bundred & F.M. Mather,
Second to Fourth Digit Ratio, Sexual Selection, and Skin Colour, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 38 (2004); Bernhard Fink, John T. Manning, Nick Neave & Karl Grammer, Second to
Fourth Digit Ratio and Facial Asymmetry, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 125 (2004);
Pamela S. Scarbrough & Victor S. Johnston, Individual Differences in Women's Facial
Preferences as a Function of Digit Ratio and Mental Rotation Ability, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 509 (2005).
57.
For an article that describes, tests, and questions the significant accretion of
knowledge surrounding the ratio of the lengths of the second to fourth manual digits as a
predictor of the degree of sexually dimorphic traits and behaviors as referenced supra note 56,
see David A. Putz, Steven J.C. Gaulin, Robert J. Sporter & Donald H. McBurney, Sex
Hormones and FingerLength: What Does 2D:4D Indicate?, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV.
182 (2004).

58.
See TRIVERS, supra note 53, at 109-44; BULLER, supra note 51, at 351-55.
59. See DAVID J.C. FLETCHER & CHARLES D. MICHINER, KIN RECOGNITION IN
ANIMALS (1987); Paul W. Sherman, Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm Calls, 197 SC.
1246 (1977); Eugene Burnstein, Christian Crandall & Shinobu Kitayama, Some NeoDarwinianDecision Rules for Altruism: Weighing Cues for Inclusive Fitness as a Function of
the Biological Importance of the Decision, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773 (1994);
MARTIN DALY, CATHERINE SALMON & MARGO WILSON, KINSHIP: THE CONCEPTUAL HOLE
IN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOCIAL COGNITION AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS IN
EVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 265 (Jeffrey A. Simpson & Douglas T. Kenrick eds.,

1997); Daniel J. Kruger, Evolution and Altruism: Combining Psychological Mediators with
Naturally Selected Tendencies, 24 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 118 (2003).
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A related hypothesis addresses the ability of individuals to
recognize others who are biologically related to them. In order for
individuals to treat others more favorably based on the degree of
biological relatedness, they would likely have to possess fairly
sophisticated mechanisms for recognizing kin. The concept of kinship
cues constitutes one possibility for such mechanisms.
Namely,
behavioral biologists hypothesize that particular sensory cues give rise to
finely tuned perceptions of kinship.6 °
One such cue is facial resemblance. Researchers have theorized
that facial resemblance evokes prosocial behavior because it serves as a
kinship cue.61 (This theory derived from the concept of kinship altruism,
with prior research indicating that individuals provide more benefits to
kin than to non-kin. 62 ) Researchers have also theorized that facial
resemblance evokes stronger prosocial behavior from men than from
women. 63 (This theory derived from the concept of paternity uncertainty
and the increased likelihood that a child who possesses similar facial
features is a man's biological child. Because a woman does not confront
the same uncertainty related to her biological child, facial similarity
should have a less powerful effect. 64)
Drawing on these theories, a team of researchers hypothesized that
an adult subject would respond favorably to a photo of a child who
shares the adult's facial features. 65 (For example, the adult is likely to be
comfortable spending the most time with the child who shares his facial
features. The adult is also likely to want to provide more financial
support to such a child. In addition, the adult is likely to discipline this
child less severely than children whose facial features do not resemble
his own.) In addition, the researchers hypothesized that the favorable
response would be stronger for male subjects than for female subjects.66
60. See Justin H. Park & Mark Schaller, Does Attitude Similarity Serve as a Heuristic
Cue for Kinship? Evidence of an Implicit Cognitive Association, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 158, 159-60 (2004).

61.
See Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to Children's Faces: Resemblance Affects
Males More than Females, 23 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (2002); Lisa M. De Bruine,
Resemblance to Self-Increases the Appeal of Child Faces to Both Men and Women, 25
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 142 (2004).

62. See TRIVERS, supra note 53, at 143; DALY, SALMON & WILSON, supra note 59;
Park & Schaller, supra note 60, at 159.
63. See Platek et al., supra note 61; Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to Children's
Faces: Males Are More Affected By Resemblance Than Females Are, and So Are Their
Brains, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 394 (2004). But see De Bruine, supra note 61.
64. See Platek et al., supra note 63, at 395; De Bruine, supra note 61, at 143.
65. See Platek et al., supra note 61.
66. Id.
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In order to test the hypotheses, the researchers morphed a photo of
a child with a photo of the adult subject, thus creating a child photo that
resembled the adult. 67 The adult subject then observed an array of child
photos, one of which was the adult subject's self morph, and responded
to a series of questions about how he or she would treat the children.68
The experiment confirmed both of the hypotheses 6. 9
After the research team published the results of their experiment, an
independent researcher questioned the study's methodology.70 She
designed and conducted a study that used enhanced technology and
procedures for morphing photos. 7' This researcher's findings supported
the hypothesis that adult individuals favor children who resemble
them. 72 However, her findings did not support the hypothesis that facial
resemblance
evokes a stronger favorable response from men than from
73
women.

The original research team responded to this second set of findings
by conducting an additional experiment.74
They improved their
morphing technique, borrowing many of the methods used by the
independent researcher.75 The third experiment yielded findings that
provide support for both hypotheses. 76(It is interesting to note that
members of this research team had conducted an earlier experiment that
allowed them to suggest that the favorable treatment effects of facial
resemblance become insignificant at a point where the resemblance in
facial appearance is less than 25%. 77 This degree of resemblance
corresponds to the degree of relatedness between grandparents and
grandchildren.7 8 Based on these findings, the researchers speculated that
once a kinship relationship is more distant than grandparent/grandchild,
facial resemblance is unlikely to evoke a significant degree of
differential favorable treatment. 79)
67. Id. at 161.
68. Id. at 161-62.
69. See Platek et al., supra note 61, at 162-64.
70. See De Bruine, supra note 61.
71.
Id. at 147.
72. Id. at 150.
73. Id.
74. See Platek et al., supra note 63.
75. Id. at 396-97.
76. Id. at 402-03.
77. See Steven M. Platek et al., How Much Paternal Resemblance Is Enough? Sex
Differences in Hypothetical Investment Decisions But Not hi the Detection of Resemblance,
24 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (2002).

78.
79.

Id. at 86-87.
Id.
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Although this line of research is not complete, 80 it provides
opportunities to apply new knowledge to the development of law and
policy. For example, the researchers' findings may be relevant to foster
care placement policies. The public has established several normative
goals for foster care placements - one of which is that public actors
should work to ensure child safety. 8 1 The research indicates that public
child welfare agencies and juvenile courts may be able to secure safer
foster care placements by matching a child's facial features with those of
her foster parent. 82 As a result of such a matching process, the foster
parent may be more likely to perceive the foster child as kin and provide
relatively favorable treatment. Because the incidence of maltreatment of
children by foster parents is significantly higher than that for children in
the general population,83 attempting to evoke favorable treatment
through face matching may provide significant benefits in terms of child
safety.84
This is an example of applied behavioral biology that embraces the
scientific method and generates a testable hypothesis. Namely, a
research team could propose that a public agency implement a facial
resemblance policy, collect data concerning child safety in this
experimental jurisdiction, and compare it to foster child safety data from
a control jurisdiction. If the rate of maltreatment is lower in the
experimental jurisdiction than in the control jurisdiction, such a study
may support the hypothesis that facial resemblance evokes favorable
treatment that provides benefits in terms of securing foster child safety.
Recently, I have expanded on my work in this area by examining
additional research on kinship cues. The research related to the kinship
cue of proximity during the first three to six years of age has
implications for foster care placement policy and the prevention of
sibling incest.85 And the research related to the kinship cue of attitude
80. This line of research provides a good example of the process of inquiry pursuant to
the scientific method. The third experiment is unlikely to be the last word in this line of
investigation. Researchers are likely to develop further experiments to test and refine the two
hypotheses related to facial resemblance as a kinship cue.
81. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (1994); David J. Herring, Foster Care Safety and the
Kinship Cue of Attitude Similarity, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 355, 359-60 (2006).
82. See David J. Herring, Child Placement Decisions: The Relevance of Facial
Resemblance and BiologicalRelationships, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 387 (2003).
83. See Herring, supra note 81, at 363.
84. See Herring, supra note 82.
85. See David J. Herring, Foster Care Placement: Reducing the Risk of Sibling Incest,
37 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1145 (2004).
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similarity has implications for foster care placement policy that are
similar to those of facial resemblance.86
All my work in this area during the past three years constitutes only
the first step in my proposed approach to legal scholarship - acquiring a
familiarity with a particular area of scientific research that is relevant to
law and policy. This first step itself is not new. 87 It requires the legal
scholar to engage research literature from a scientific discipline. It also
involves the legal scholar in an examination of the possible relevance of
specific research findings to particular areas of law and policy.
However, this first step does not involve the legal scholar in the process
of scientific research. That is the subject of the second step, the step that
makes this approach to legal scholarship new.
It is important to note at the outset that the second step in this
approach stands apart from Professor Ulen's (and others') call for legal
scholars to engage in empirical research. 88 Ulen urges legal scholars to
conduct empirical research concerning the operation of the law.8 9 His
examples present the legal scholar as a self-directed, independent
empirical researcher. 90
This scholar may work with others (e.g.
economists, statisticians), but she designs and conducts the empirical
studies. Ulen's is the ambitious vision of law as science and the legal
scholar as social scientist.
In contrast, the second step in my proposed approach calls for the
legal scholar to become a member of a scientific research team. For
example, in conducting my work on the kinship cue of attitude similarity
I had an occasion to e-mail Justin Park, the lead researcher in one
important study. 9 1 I asked him for the complete list of attitudes they had
included in their research instrument. He responded not only with the
list, but with a welcoming message. He was pleased to learn that

86. See Herring, supra note 81.
87.
See, e.g., Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law, supra note 2; Jones, supra note 12;
Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of
Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997) (using social cognition research to analyze
hate crimes).
88. See Ulen, supra note 28, at 418-23; Schneider & Teitelbaum, supra note 42;
Michael Heise, The Past, Present and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819; Frank Cross, Michael
Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 135 (2002); Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams,
Dolphins, and Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803.

89.
90.
91.

See Ulen, supra note 28, at 418-23.
Id. at415-23.
See Herring, supra note 81, at 375 n. 112.
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someone is exploring the practical implications of their research. He
asked for my article on facial resemblance and opened the door to
further discussion. 92 We have since shared several draft papers and
engaged in discussions of kinship cue research.
By engaging a scientific researcher in this type of substantive
discussion, a legal scholar may eventually be invited to join a research
team. As a member of the research team, the legal scholar may be able
to make substantial contributions such as the identification of
appropriate contexts for studies and experiments.93 In my case, I could
stress the potential of foster care systems to provide a natural setting for
testing hypotheses addressing the likely impact of various kinship cues
on biologically unrelated individuals. Because foster care requires
adults to provide care for unrelated children, the research team may be
able to use this setting to explore how various kinship cues affect the
treatment of foster children.
More commonly, the legal scholar may be able to raise interesting
and fruitful research inquiries.94 For example, in my work using kinship
cues I have regularly referenced the federal Multiethnic Placement Act
("MEPA"). 95 This law prohibits public child welfare agencies from
92. See e-mail from Justin H. Park (Sept. 6, 2005) (on file with author).
93. To illustrate this possible contribution, consider that I met legal scholar John Lanou
at an April, 2006 conference sponsored by the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law. He
has engaged in research with behavioral biologist Debra Lieberman of the University of
Hawaii. Together, they have hypothesized that judges who grew up in close proximity to an
opposite sex sibling would find incest especially repugnant and impose harsher sentences in
incest cases than judges who did not have this type of experience with a sibling. They are
attempting to test this hypothesis which is based on the kinship cue of proximity during
childhood. John Lanou, as a legal scholar, was able to recognize this possible impact on
criminal sentencing and to assist in designing a study to test the hypothesis in an appropriate
context.
94. To illustrate this possible contribution, consider Owen Jones' recent collaboration
with primatologist Sarah Brosnan, investigating the endowment effect from an evolutionary
perspective. The endowment effect is evident when individuals immediately value an item
they have just come to own at a higher dollar amount than the maximum amount they would
have paid to acquire the item an instant ago. The phenomenon has implications for law,
because it can impede efficient trading of goods and services in the marketplace. And Jones,
as well as Jones and Goldsmith, had argued that the phenomenon may reflect the effects of
evolutionary processes on human predispositions, possibly resulting in patterns only
recognizable and predictable in light of evolutionary analysis. See Jones, Law's Leverage,
supra note 2, at 1154-55, 1183-85; Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 452-54. Jones has
consequently partnered with a primatologist to begin testing specific hypotheses in
chimpanzees which may indicate a long evolutionary history to the phenomenon in both
humans and other primates.
95. Pub. L. No. 103-382 § 551.108 Stat. 4056 (1994) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C.
§ 1996b (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996)). See Herring, supra note 81;
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systematically using race as a factor in deciding whether to place a child
in a particular foster home.96 The law is controversial. It fuels intense
public debate concerning basic social values surrounding race. Namely,
it pits a public goal of a color-blind society against the possible social
benefits of maintaining children within their racial communities, being
raised by adults who can fully appreciate and educate them about their
97
racial identity.
To date, the debate has not addressed MEPA's impact on child
safety to any significant degree. However, if race is a characteristic that
is likely to affect an adult's perception of a child as kin, a prohibition on
race matching may have negative consequences for child safety in foster
care. In other words, a practice of matching a foster child's race with
that of his foster parent may help achieve a public goal of child safety.98
In addressing this issue, it would be useful to know about the
relationship between race and kinship cues (or superficial similarities99 )
that evoke favorable treatment.
Therefore, this inquiry identifies
possible avenues for useful behavioral biology research. For example,
researchers could test the hypothesis that a child who shares facial
features including race with an unrelated adult evokes more favorable
treatment than a child who shares facial features but not race.
Researchers could test this hypothesis through photo morphing
experiments in the laboratory. They could also attempt to test this
hypothesis in the foster care setting.
In relation to the latter possibility, the legal scholar could make
additional substantial contributions to the research team. She could help
the research team identify and measure forms of favorable treatment

Herring, supra note 82.
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2000).
97. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN:

ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY,
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003); Twila L.

Perry, The TransracialAdoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33 (1993-94); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Transracial
Adoption (TRA): Old Prejudices and DiscriminationFloat Under a New Halo, 6 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 409 (1997).

98. See Herring, supra note 81; Herring, supra note 82.
99. In my discussions with behavioral biologist Debra Lieberman I have come to realize
that race is unlikely to be an actual kinship cue. Distinctive racial features developed too late
in human evolutionary history to operate as a cue for kinship. However, race may operate as a
superficial similarity signal that evokes favorable treatment from others much as a kinship cue
would. See Jerry M. Burger, Nicole Messian, Shebani Patel, Alicia del Prado & Carmen
Anderson, What a Coincidence! The Effects of Incidental Similarity on Compliance, 30
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 35 (2004).
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within foster care settings. She could also assist the team in gaining
access to necessary data from foster care systems.
As a legal
professional, she would likely have a degree of credibility with judges
and agency officials that would facilitate access to detailed information.
Once the research team completes its test of the hypothesis, the
legal scholar would work with team members to communicate the results
to legal decisionmakers and public policymakers. This new information
would not dictate any particular legal or policy outcomes, but it might be
worthy of consideration. For example, if researchers find that race
matching would likely enhance child safety to some degree, public
officials may want to use this information to pursue a color-blind foster
care system with care and sophistication.' 0 0
The legal scholar's goal is not only to learn from scientific
researchers or to engage them in discussions of law and policy, but also
to form partnerships with scientific researchers - to actually join the
research team. This goal presents a substantial challenge to a legal
scholar inclined to pursue this approach. It requires the scholar to reach
outside her area of expertise and comfort in order to build working
relationships with researchers in fields other than law.
Pursuing full participation in scientific research provides part of the
answer to the question of what is next for law and behavioral biology.
As a member of a behavioral biology research team, the legal scholar
can actively participate in the creation and dissemination of new
knowledge that serves some of the important functions identified by
Owen Jones and Timothy Goldsmith in their Columbia Law Review
article.' 0 1 For example, new knowledge could contribute substantially to
a fuller awareness of conflicts among various social and public policy

100. As a member of a research team examining kinship cues the legal scholar could
raise many other questions related to foster care. For example, does the practice of placing
foster children with biologically related adults enhance safety? Does the magnitude of the
safety effect vary by degree of relatedness, with more distantly related kin providing little or
no increase in safety compared to unrelated foster parents? Does an agency practice of
including close family friends or neighbors as kin yield safety benefits? As an example of
another line of possible inquiry, researchers may want to examine the relevance of kinship
cues in pursuing the dominant public goal of achieving timely, stable permanent placements
for foster children. Namely, would the consideration of kinship cues in the placement process
possibly result in more and/or quicker adoption outcomes for foster children with their foster
parents? Also, does the consideration of kinship cues in making adoption placements result in
more stability and a reduced likelihood of adoption disruption in the future? By participating
as a member of a scientific research team, the legal scholar could raise these types of
questions and identify appropriate contexts for scientific research.
101. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 2.

20071

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

goals. 0 2 It could also provide a fuller identification and understanding
of the costs and benefits related to current or proposed laws and
policies. 10 3 And as Owen Jones and I have discussed, knowledge
produced by behavioral biology research could serve to fortify current
legal and policy approaches.1°4
In conclusion, my proposed approach to legal scholarship does not
conceive of law as a science. It also does not place the legal scholar in
the role of a scientist or empiricist. Instead, the legal scholar plays a
more modest role - as a participating member of a scientific research
team. In this role, the legal scholar contributes to a research endeavor
that employs the scientific method to produce new knowledge mostly in
small, incremental steps. She strives for nothing more than to participate
in the production of new knowledge and the effective communication of
that knowledge to other legal scholars, legal decisionmakers, and
policymakers. It is a role that both requires humility and promises
significant advances in knowledge relevant to law and policy.

102. Id. at 435-36.
103.
Id. at 436.
104. For an example of this function, consider my article addressing sibling incest.
Herring, supra note 81. Behavioral biology research indicates that opposite sex siblings who
live together during the first four to six years of life develop a sexual aversion to each other.
Separation of opposite sex siblings during this period increases the risk of subsequent sibling
incest. I use this research to assert the importance of placing young opposite sex siblings
together in the same foster home if foster care is required. This assertion fortifies and
strengthens the existing policy to place siblings together. See id.

